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ABSTRACT 
The population of Finland is projected along eleven different scenarios assuming widely 
diverging alternative trends in fertility, mortality and migration up to the year 2100. The 
definitions of these scenarios follow those of a recent study (Lutz, 1991) on Europe and 
North America. They range from constant rates to assuming replacement fertility versus 
a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of 1.1, mortality stagnation versus a strong increase in life 
expectancy, and no immigration versus 30,000 migrants per year. The results show that 
no matter what scenario is chosen, the next 30 years will bring an enormous increase of 
the population over age 65. The proportion in working age will be relatively stable up 
to the year 2010 and then strongly decline under all conditions, which is a consequence 
of the Finnish baby boom of the late 1940s. Projected total population sizes in 2050 will 
range from 3.5 million in the fertility decline scenario to 6.6 million in the high 
immigration scenario. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Defining and calculating widely diverging alternative scenarios for the more distant 
future has become a favorite activity of scientists in the field of global and regional 
environmental change. In the absence of any certainty about trends in the coming 
decades, it turns out to be a useful exercise for understanding the phenomena and for 
finding appropriate policies for sustainable development to look at a number of 
alternative if-then relationships: If the CO, concentration in the atmosphere doubled by 
2030 then certain effects on the climate could be expected. Or in demography: If fertility 
and mortality remained at their present level, then the population size of Finland would 
decline to 3.6 million by the year 2050 and 2.3 million by the year 2100; if alternatively 
fertility increased to replacement level by 2000, everything else remaining the same, then 
the Finnish population would increase slightly during the first half of next century and 
then remain constant at about 5 million. 
Any consistent set of assumptions about future trends may be called a scenario. 
As compared to scenarios on the above-mentioned environmental questions or any kind 
of economic forecasting, demographic scenarios have the great advantage that, given a 
starting population, assumptions on only three variables--namely fertility, mortality and 
migration--completely determine size and age structure of the population at any point 
in the future. Other disciplines with many more uncertainties about the consequences 
of a given set of assumptions look with envy to demography. And yet demographers do 
not seem to enjoy this opportunity much judging from the lack of alternative projections 
assuming demographic discontinuities. 
Traditionally, population projection efforts concentrate on producing one most 
likely set of assumptions based on the continuation of present trends or sometimes based 
on the wishful thinking that fertility levels would increase to replacement level. 
Projections are usually presented in the form of a medium variant which is surrounded 
by a high and a low variant based on slightly different assumptions. This basic belief in 
structural stability is a pragmatic approach to short and medium term forecasts. For 
studying longer term population prospects and for considering the possibility of even 
short and medium term demographic discontinuities (for which an example is the post- 
war baby boom), a broader approach with a larger number of alternative scenarios is 
more appropriate. These scenarios should all be theoretically possible but need not be 
very likely according to our present thinking. 
In formulating a broad range of possible alternative assumptions about future 
trends in fertility, mortality and migration, we need not take the extreme approach of 
viewing these trends as completely undetermined random processes. There is a large 
stock of knowledge in biology, medicine, sociology, psychology, economics and other 
disciplines that is relevant to our understanding about possible future changes in human 
longevity, reproduction, and international migratory flows. If possible demographic 
discontinuities or surprises could be anticipated at all, this cannot be done by the analysis 
of past trends but by considering knowledge in this broader socioeconomic, cultural and 
biological context. 
This interdisciplinary context is the focus of a recent book entitled Future 
Demographic Trends in Europe and North America: What Can We Assume Today? edited 
by W. Lutz (1991). In this book 31 authors give their views about possible future trends 
in mortality, fertility and international migration. Considerations on longevity in Part I 
range from a survey of currently used assumptions to the construction of a limit life 
table, the consideration of occupational mortality differentials and possible impacts of 
AIDS, adverse environmental factors, new biotechnologies, and health promotion 
programs. Part I1 considers the future of reproduction: A survey of currently used 
assumptions, fa~llrly size distributions, birth expectations, social and cultural factors 
associated with motherhood, relevant policies and the concept of stabilization after the 
fertility transition. Part I11 finally looks at migration from a social, economic and 
political point of view and considers several country case studies. In the final chapter, 
the alternative views expressed by the experts are translated into numbers which serve 
as input to a set of ten different scenario calculations for West Europe, East Europe, and 
North America. 
This article will try to put the specific case of Finland into the context of the above- 
described book. Based on the substantive articles in the book, scenarios for Finland will 
be defined in analogy to those assumed for West Europe. Hence, in the following paper 
the logic behind the different scenario specifications will not be discussed extensively. 
For these questions we refer the reader to the above-mentioned book. In terms of 
results we will compare the figures for Finland to those obtained for East and West 
Europe. 
2. DEFINITION OF SCENARIOS 
Table 1 gives a full account of the assumptions which entered the different scenario 
calculations that were performed for Finland. The population starts in the year 1985 
with the given age and sex composition of the Finnish population of that year. The 
population is grouped into 5-year age groups and the projection is performed in 5-year 
steps. For the calculations DIALOG was used, a user-friendly piece of software for 
multi-state population projections developed at IIASA (see Scherbov and Grechucha, 
1988). 
First a constant rates scenario (Scenario 0) assumes that all rates remain constant 
at their 1985-87 level. Next the assumptions made in the UN medium variant for 
Finland are taken as a point of reference (Scenario 1). All other scenarios (2 to 10) 
correspond directly to the scenario definitions made for Europe in Lutz (1991). Since 
the starting values for Finland in 1985-87 are quite similar to the average starting values 
in West Europe in 1985, the path of change between the starting year and the assumed 
levels in the next century is also almost identical in the Finnish scenarios to those for 
West Europe. 
Table 1. Assumptions of 11 demographic scenarios for Finland. 
Scenario 
0 Constant Rate 
Fertility Mortality Net 
(TFR) (Life expect.) migration 
women men per year 
1 UN Medium Variant 1990 1.65 78.8 71.0 
2000 1.70 80.2 72.9 
2025 1.80 83.0 76.2 
2 Replacement Fertility 1990 1.65 78.8 71.0 
2000 2.10 80.2 72.9 
2025 2.10 83.0 76.2 
3 Fertility Decline 1990 1.60 78.8 71.0 
2000 1.46 80.2 72.9 
2025 1.10 83.0 76.2 
4 Mortality Stagnation 1990 1.65 78.7 70.7 
2000 1.70 78.7 70.7 
2025 1.80 78.7 70.7 
5 Mortality Decline 1990 1.65 78.8 71.0 
2000 1.70 83.4 76.4 
2025 1.80 95.0 90.0 
7 Moderate Migration 1990 1.65 78.8 71.0 +10000 
2000 1.70 80.2 72.9 +10000 
2025 1.80 83.0 76.2 +10000 
8 High Migration 1990 1.65 78.8 71.0 +30000 
2000 1.70 80.2 72.9 +30000 
2025 1.80 83.0 76.2 +30000 
9 Scenario 3+8 combined 1990 1.60 78.8 71.0 +30000 
2000 1.46 80.2 72.9 +30000 
2025 1.10 83.0 76.2 +30000 
10 Scenario 6+8 combined 1990 1.60 78.8 71.0 +30000 
2000 1.46 83.4 76.4 +30000 
2025 1.10 95.0 90.0 +30000 
Starting year of projections is 1985; observed fertility and mortality 
between 1985 and 1987; linear interpolation between the intervals given 
above; after 2025 fertility, mortality and migration are kept constant. 
Next it is assumed that fertility levels increase to replacement level (i.e. a Total 
Fertility Rate (TFR) of 2.1) by the year 2000 (Scenario 2), assumptions on mortality 
stemming from the UN scenario. In contrast, the rapid fertility decline scenario 
(Scenario 3) assumes a decrease of the TFR to 1.46 in 2000 and 1.10 in 2025. In the 
mortality stagnation scenario (Scenario 4) no further improvements in life expectancy are 
assumed. The mortality decline scenario (Scenario 5) on the other hand assumes further 
increases in life expectancy at birth resulting in 90 years for men and 95 years for women 
after the year 2025. The fertility and mortality decline scenario (Scenario 6) is a 
combination of Scenarios 3 and 5. Finally, the moderate migration scenario (Scenario 
7) assumes an annual net inflow of 10,000 foreigners into Finland each year, whereas the 
high migration scenario (Scenario 8) assumes a net gain of 30,000 persons per year. The 
age and sex composition of the migrants was assumed to be identical to those in the 
European scenarios, namely 52% men and 48% women with a mean age of around 25 
years. The last two scenarios considered are combinations of fertility decline and high 
immigration (Scenario 9) and of fertility decline, mortality decline, and high immigration 
(Scenario 10). 
3. RESULTING CHANGES IN POPULATION SIZE 
Table 2a gives the total population size of Finland, the corresponding annual 
number of births and the average annual natural growth rates of the population for all 
scenarios considered. Data are given in ten-year intervals up to 2030, then for 2050, and 
even for 2100 to demonstrate the very long term impact of the rates considered in the 
various scenarios. 
Concerning the total population size over the next 40 years (i.e. by 2030), a range 
is opened from between 4.36 million in the case of all rates remaining constant and 6.16 
million in the case of the high immigration scenario. In the latter case about 1.2 million 
of the population will not be born in Finland. By the year 2050 the range is further 
opened with the fertility decline scenario resulting in 3.49 million at the lower end and 
again the high immigration scenario with 6.6 million at the top. By the year 2100 these 
two extreme scenarios would result in 1.36 versus 7.79 million people living in Finland 
(see Figure 1). 
The absolute number of births per year under the various scenarios mirrors the 
patterns described above. Under the UN scenario (Scenario 1) the number of births 
declines from 63,000 in 1985 to 43,000 by the year 2050. Under the high immigration 
scenario, however, the number of births would increase to 74,000 in 2050. A comparison 
of these two figures shows that, in the high immigration scenario, almost half of the 
births in 2050 would be of other than Finnish ethnic origin. Under the replacement 
fertility scenario, the number of births would stabilize slightly above 60,000 per year 
whereas in the fertility decline scenario it would be as low as 17,000 in the year 2050. 
Table 2a. Population size and growth, Finland 1990-2100. 
a. Total population size (in 1000) 
0 Constant Rate 4971 
1 UN medium 
2 Repl.Fertility 
3 Fert . Decline 
4 Mort.Stagnation 
5 Mort. Decline 
6 Fer./Mor. Decline 
7 Mod. Migration 
8 High Migration 
9 Sce.3+8 combined 
10 Sce.6+8 combined 
b. Number of births (in 1000) 
Constant Rate 61 
UN medium 
Repl.Fertility 
Fert.Decline 
Mort.Stagnation 
Mort. Decline 
Fer./Mor.Decline 
Mod. Migration 
High Migration 
Sce.3+8 combined 
Sce. 6+8 combined 
c. Average annual natural growth rate of the population (in % )  
Constant Rate 
UN medium 
Rep1 . Fertility 
Fert.Decline 
Mort.Stagnation 
Mort.Decline 
Fer./Mor.Decline 
Mod. Migration 
High Migration 
Sce. 3+8 combined 
Sce.6+8 combined 
- Const. Rates - - - - UN medlum ....... Repl.Fertlllty 
- - Fert.Decllne -..-. MohDecllne --- F/M.Decllne 
....... 
- Const.Rates - - - - UN medlum Mod.Mlgratlon 
- - Hlgh Mlgratlon -..-. Scenarlo 3+8 --- Scenarlo 6+8 
Figure 1. Total population size in Finland, 1990-2100 by scenario. 
A look at the average annual rates of natural growth (which is determined by the 
balance of deaths and births excluding migration) shows that, in the medium term, only 
a few scenarios result in negative growth rates whereas in the longer term all of them 
show negative growth rates. The reason for this lies in the present age structure of the 
Finnish population which still has relatively large cohorts in the reproductive ages. In 
the coming decades, however, the aging of the population will be so strong that even 
an increase of fertility to replacement level cannot counterbalance the large number of 
deaths due to the large number of old people. 
Finland has presently 1.3% of the population of the total Western European 
population of 384 million. The population of Eastern Europe including the European 
republics of the Soviet Union (and the Asian part of the Russian republic) stands 
presently around 355 million. Table 2b shows that the scenarios for Eastern and 
Western Europe open up a range of possible future population sizes similar to that 
discussed above for Finland. The proportion of the Finnish population in all of Western 
Europe is unlikely to change under any given scenario. Only if demographic trends in 
Finland evolved differently from those in the rest of Europe will the proportion of Finns 
in Europe change. 
Table 2b. Population size, Europe 1990-2050. 
Total population size (in millions) 
West Europe 
UN medium 
Repl.Fertility 
Fert.Decline 
Mort.Stagnation 
Mort.Decline 
Fer . /Mor . Decline 
Mod. Migration 
High Migration 
Sce. 3+8 combined 
Sce. 6+8 combined 
East Europe 
4. CONSEQUENCES ON THE POPULATION AGE STRUCTURE 
Table 3a gives the age structure of the population by broad age-groups, namely 
children aged 0-14 years, population in active age (15-64 years), and elderly aged 65 and 
over, for the 11 scenarios investigated. Data are given as in Table 2a. 
Currently, 19.3% of the population are dependent children and 13.4% dependent 
adults aged 65 and over, resulting in 67.3% working age population. These figures come 
very close to the figures for West Europe (see Table 3b). There are considerable 
differences in the paths of change depending on scenario, but two changes will occur 
regardless of the scenario. The proportion over 65 will rise until 2030, with low fertility 
and/or mortality even until the end of the next century. The increase is smallest during 
the following two decades, but will accentuate significantly after 2010. The least 
calculated increase from 1990 to 2030 is 55% with the high immigration scenario (8), the 
largest increase is 140% under the declining fertility and mortality scenario (6). The 
latter scenario even gives an increase of 210% until 2050 and more than 330% until 2100 
(see Figure 2). Aging is not only certain, but the potential for aging in the present 
population structure is massive. 
The evolution of the proportion of elderly people in Finland is essentially parallel 
with that in West Europe (see Tables 3a and 3b). In 2020 the proportion is slightly 
higher in Finland, but in 2050 it is slightly lower. The reason for this divergence is the 
fact that the post-war baby boom in Finland peaked about 15 years earlier (highest 
fertility in 1947148) than in most other parts of Europe. When these large cohorts reach 
retirement age, the proportion aged 65 + will increase more rapidly than elsewhere. In 
Eastern Europe the proportions of elderly are consistently lower than in Western 
Europe. 
The second omnipresent tendency is a decrease in the proportion of children (ages 
0-14) and adults (ages 15-64) in all scenarios (see Table 3a). From 1990 to 2010 the 
increase in the proportion of elderly results only in a decrease in the proportion of 
children. After 2010, however, both the proportion of children and the proportion of 
people of working age decline. Only an increase in fertility to replacement level 
(Scenario 2) could in the long run partly reverse the trend for children. The decrease 
in the proportion of children stops after 2010-2020 if no decline in fertility and/or 
mortality is assumed. The most extreme scenario (fertility and mortality decline, 6) 
halves the proportion of children to 10% in 2030, and again halves it to only 5% in 2100. 
High immigration combined with a decline in fertility (Scenario 9) would only delay the 
process. The paths of change in the proportion of children in Finland are again very 
close to West Europe, the proportion being always higher in East Europe (see Tables 
3a and 3b). 
Table 3a. Population age structure, Finland 1990-2100. 
a. Proportion of children, aged 0-14 years (in % )  
0 Constant Rate 19.3% 17.2% 15.6% 15.3% 14.6% 14.5% 14.4% 
1 UN medium 17.4% 15.9% 15.7% 15.3% 15.4% 15.5% 
2 Rep1 . Fertility 17.4% 18.1% 18.3% 17.7% 18.8% 19.0% 
3 Fert . Decline 17.4% 15.0% 13.0% 11.0% 9.0% 7.4% 
4 Mort.Stagnation 17.5% 16.2% 16.3% 16.1% 16.5% 16.7% 
5 Mort. Decline 17.4% 15.8% 15.2% 14.2% 13.4% 13.0% 
6 Fer or. Decline 17.4% 14.9% 12.6% 10.1% 7.6% 5.2% 
7 ~ o d .  ~igration 17.8% 16.5% 16.4% 16.1% 16.2% 16.4% 
8 High Migration 17.9% 17.0% 17.2% 17.1% 17.3% 17.1% 
9 Sce.3+8 combined 17.9% 16.0% 14.4% 12.7% 11.1% 10.7% 
10 Sce.6+8 combined 17.9% 15.9% 14.0% 11.8% 9.9% 8.8% 
b. Proportion of working age population, aged 15-64 years (in % )  
0 Constant Rate 67.3% 68.3% 68.6% 64.3% 62.7% 62.4% 62.3% 
1 UN medium 67.8% 67.4% 62.2% 59.5% 58.8% 59.3% 
2 Repl. ~ertility 67.8% 65.7% 60.6% 58.9% 59.1% 60.4% 
3 Fert.Decline 67.8% 68.2% 64.1% 61.9% 59.2% 51.4% 
4 Mort.Stagnation 68.0% 68.2% 63.7% 62.0% 62.2% 62.9% 
5 Mort. Decline 67.8% 67.1% 60.5% 55.8% 51.8% 50.1% 
6 Fer./Mor.Decline 67.8% 67.8% 62.2% 57.7% 50.8% 36.9% 
7 Mod. Migration 67.8% 67.6% 63.0% 60.9% 60.4% 61.0% 
8 High Migration 67.9% 67.7% 63.6% 62.2% 62.5% 62.4% 
9 Sce.3+8 combined 67.9% 68.5% 65.7% 65.0% 64.4% 61.3% 
10 Sce.6+8 combined 67.9% 68.1% 64.0% 61.4% 57.7% 51.3% 
c. Proportion of elderly, aged 65 years and over (in % )  
OConstantRate 13.4% 14.5% 15.8% 20.5% 22.7% 23.1% 23.4% 
1 UN medium 14.8% 16.6% 22.1% 25.1% 25.9% 25.2% 
2 Repl.Fertility 14.8% 16.2% 21.0% 23.4% 22.1% 20.6% 
3 Fert . Decline 14.8% 16.8% 22.9% 27.2% 31.8% 41.3% 
4 Mort.Stagnation 14.5% 15.7% 20.1% 21.9% 21.3% 20.4% 
5 Mort.Decline 14.8% 17.1% 24.4% 30.0% 34.8% 36.9% 
6 Fer./Mor.Decline 14.8% 17.3% 25.2% 32.2% 41.6% 57.9% 
7 Mod. Migration 14.4% 15.9% 20.6% 23.0% 23.4% 22.7% 
8 High Migration 14.2% 15.4% 19.2% 20.7% 20.3% 20.5% 
9 Sce.3+8 combined 14.2% 15.5% 19.9% 22.3% 24.5% 28.0% 
10 Sce.6+8 combined 14.2% 16.0% 22.0% 26.7% 32.4% 39.9% 
Table 3b. Population age structure, Europe 1990-2050. 
Proportion of children, aged 0-14 years (in % )  
West Europe East Europe 
UN medium 18.6 
Repl.Fertility 
Fert . Decline 
Mort.Stagnation 
Mort. Decline 
Fer./Mor.Decline 
Mod. Migration 
High Migration 
Sce.3+8 combined 
Sce.6+8 combined 
b. Proportion of working age population, aged 15-64 years (in % )  
West Europe East Europe 
UN medium 67.3 
Repl.Fertility 
Fert.Decline 
Mort.Stagnation 
Mort.Decline 
Fer . /Mor . Decline 
Mod. Migration 
High Migration 
Sce. 3+8 combined 
Sce.6+8 combined 
c. Proportion of elderly, aged 65 years and over (in % )  
West Europe East Europe 
1990 2020 2050 1990 2020 2050 
1 UN medium 14.2 
2 Repl.Fertility 
3 Fert . Decline 
4 Mort.Stagnation 
5 Mort.Decline 
6 Fer./Mor.Decline 
7 Mod. Migration 
8 High Migration 
9 Sce.3+8 combined 
10 Sce.6+8 combined 
- - MohDecllne -.--. F/M.Decllne -.- Hlgh Mlgratlon 
Figure 2. Proportion elderly (aged 65+), Finland, 1990-2100 by scenario. 
The decline in the proportion of working age adults is generally smaller, but 
nevertheless very significant, especially between 2010 and 2030 (see Figure 3). With 
presently about 67% in the age group 15-64, this proportion may decline by 2050 to 
around 50-52% (mortality decline scenarios, 6 and 7); the largest proportion found in 
2050 is 64.4% (in the high immigration and low fertility scenario, 9). These proportions 
are lower than in both West and East Europe in 2020 for the reasons described above, 
and somewhere in between the two regions in 2050 (see Tables 3a and 3b). 
Calculations for Finland to the year 2100 demonstrate that a strong decline in 
fertility and mortality at the same time (as assumed in Scenario 6) would result in a 
population age structure which is difficult to imagine: Almost 60% of the population 
would be older than 65 in 2100, only around 35% working age adults and 5% children. 
While today there are two elderly to ten working age adults, under Scenario 6 in 2100, 
there would be 15 elderly to ten of working age. 
It is also interesting to see that some scenarios result in similar proportions in the 
major age groups following very different paths. For example, the replacement fertility 
scenario (2) and the fertility decline scenario (3) lead to the same proportion of working 
age adults in 2050, namely 59%. The proportion of children, however, is twice as high 
in Scenario 2 than in Scenario 3. The proportion of elderly differs in the opposite 
direction. It also happens that different assumptions lead to a similar age structure but 
very different total population sizes. Scenarios 4 (mortality stagnation) and 8 (high 
immigration), for instance, show almost identical proportions at different ages in the long 
run, but total population size is only 3 million in 2100 under Scenario 4 while it is almost 
7.8 million under Scenario 8 (see Tables 2a and 3a). 
- - Mort.Decllne -..-. F/M.Decllne -.- Hlgh Mlgratlon 
Figure 3. Proportion active (aged 15-64), Finland, 1990-2100 by scenario. 
If one is looking for a single summary indicator describing population aging, then 
the mean age of the population provides a useful measure. Table 4 gives those mean 
ages of the population under the different scenarios for Finland and for Europe. 
Presently mean ages are almost identical in Finland and West Europe, 37.5 years, 
whereas the mean age in Eastern Europe is more than two years lower. Under all 
scenarios the mean age of the population will further increase up to the year 2030. 
Under the constant rate and UN scenarios in Finland, the mean age will level off during 
the second half of next century at around 44-45 years. 
The largest increase in the mean age results from Scenario 6, (declining fertility and 
mortality) where it would reach 55 years in 2030 and an incredible 63 years in 2100. It 
is also interesting to see that the fertility decline scenario in each year results in a 
somewhat higher mean age than the mortality decline scenario. With 41.3 years in 2050, 
the high immigration scenario results in the lowest mean age of all scenarios which still 
is significantly higher than today's mean age. It is very unlikely that the mean age of the 
Finnish population will ever come back to the present level which is already considered 
very high by historical standards. 
Table 4. Mean age of the population (in years). 
a. Finland 1990-2100 
0 Constant Rate 37.4 
1 UN medium 
2 Repl.Fertility 
3 Fert . Decline 
4 Mort.Stagnation 
5 Mort.Decline 
6 Fer./Mor.Decline 
7 Mod. Migration 
8 High Migration 
9 Sce.3+8 combined 
10 Sce.6+8 combined 
b. Europe 1990-2050 
West Europe 
UN medium 37.6 
Repl.Fertility 
Fert.Decline 
Mort.Stagnation 
Mort.Decline 
Fer./Mor.Decline 
Mod. Migration 
High Migration 
Sce. 3+8 combined 
Sce.6+8 combined 
East Europe 
5. CONCLUSION 
The above-described long range population scenarios for Finland do not want to 
provide the reader with one most likely population projection. But the reader can use 
the presented material in two different ways. Firstly, he may choose his own favorite 
scenario and look up the implications of this scenario for the future of the Finnish 
population without having to perform his own population projections. Secondly, and 
more importantly, this set of widely diverging scenarios based on assumptions reflecting 
the opposing opinions of a large number of scientists in different fields could give us 
some idea about the possible range of future population sizes and structures. We also 
could see how sensitive or insensitive certain demographic indicators are to possible 
future demographic discontinuities. Finally, the comparison of the scenarios help us to 
distinguish inevitable trends such as the massive aging of the population from more 
flexible demographic features. 
The scenario calculations indicate that there are two factors that can possibly stop 
or at least slow down the decline in the population size of Finland and an extreme 
greying of the society: Fertility increase and immigration. As seen from Scenario 3, a 
rapid increase of average fertility to around 2.1 children per woman could in the long run 
stabilize the population. However, prospects for a sustained fertility increase are not 
good. As pointed out by Westoff (1991) and Keyfitz (1991), for industrialized societies 
in general, many factors even let us expect a further decline in fertility. And even the 
often stated fertility increase in Sweden seems to be a rather short term period 
phenomenon (Hoem, 1990). Hence, responsible policy makers in Finland, as in other 
Western European countries, will have to consider seriously the immigration option. 
In the short and medium run immigration will clearly improve the proportion of 
population in the active ages and help to dampen anticipated crises, such as the 
retirement of the baby boom. In the long run it is no remedy against aging because 
immigrants will also retire and stay in the country. 
The next decade will give Finland a grace period with still relatively large 
proportions in the working ages. This time could be used to develop rational and 
socially acceptable immigration policies as well as possible forms of extended working 
ages so that the retirement of the baby boom generation does not hit the country 
unprepared. 
Finally, the comparison of Finnish population patterns to Eastern and Western 
Europe shows that, in demographic terms, Finland is very close to the average of 
Western Europe and different from the average of Eastern Europe. The expected 
further integration of Western European economies and societies is likely to link the 
Finnish population patterns even more strongly to the Western European ones in the 
medium to long term. 
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